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utility tax, the retail sales tax, and the compensating (use) tax, including the changes relative to the tax reporting procedures, with
minor exceptions. 6 As to the applicability of the changes in the tax
rates and tax classifications on transactions entered into prior to April
1, 1959, but concluded after that date, see the Tax Commission's Rule
235, entitled: "Effect of Rate Changes on Prior Contracts and Sales
Agreements." 7 July 1, 1959, was the effective date of the new tax on
tobacco products other than cigarettes. 8 January 1, 1960, will be the
effective date of the change in the method of distributing the proceeds
of the public utility district privilege tax. June 11, 1959, was the
effective date of all changes other than those for which a different
effective date was specified.
MAX KAMINOFF

TRUSTS
The Washington Trust Act. The Washington Trust Act, chapter
124, Session Laws of 1959, enacted in the last legislative session, is
the culmination of a movement sponsored chiefly by the trust companies, who pointed out that the expanded use of trusts in our modern
economy has made it imperative that trust law be precise and specific.
The lack of standardization with regard to powers and duties of
trustees makes the administration of trusts increasingly a matter of
attempting to determine applicable law and the extent of the trustees'
powers. Advantages which otherwise might be had for the trust are
lost through the trustee's doubt as to his authority to proceed. It was
also pointed out that the drafting of such an act would permit a better
understanding of the instrument by the trustor and provide a more
orderly administration of trusts.
Although the act was passed with little or no expression of public
opinion, newspaper comment, or legislative debate, the drafting was
carefully undertaken by a committee of trust men and a group from
the State Bar Association. To assist their drafting, they used the
86

The exceptions: Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 211 (Special business and occupation

tax rate on manufacture of seafood products), Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 232 (vending
machines not "retail stores or outlets" for purposes of wholesaling functions tax), and

Wash. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 259 (special business and occupation tax rate on wholesale
sales of cigarettes by manufacturers from stocks warehoused in this state) were
effective June 11, 1959.
37 In Klickitat County v. Jenner, 15 Wn.2d 373, 130 P.2d 880 (1942), the court held
that the extension in 1941 of the retail sales tax to construction work was applicable
to work performed after the effective date of that change in the law, even though the
contracts were entered into prior to that date.
38 Wash.E-. Sess. Laws 1959, c. 5, § 10 et seq., and c. 5, § 23.
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Uniform Trust Act adopted by the Commission on Uniform Laws
in 1937 and since adopted in a fewistates, various other uniform acts
in the trust field, state statutes, and prevailing practices followed in
this jurisdiction in drafting trust instruments. Some provisions of the
acts were followed verbatim, while in others considerable deviation
was employed.
The resultant act which applies to express trusts is very lengthy
and comprehensive. No attempt is here made other than to make
some general observations as to its more significant features. A trustee
is generally held to have only those powers conferred upon him by the
trust instrument or those which can be inferred therefrom. Due to
the fact that determining inferred powers is both a difficult and variable
matter, trustees are hesitant to proceed to act unless they have court
authority. This involves expense and delay. It is the normal desire
of trustors to give their trustees sufficiently broad powers so they can
effectively carry out the terms of the trust. The present act, which
provides such broad powers, is virtually a complete trust instrument
which a draftsman can find most advantageous to use and at the same
time be sure that any omission or incomplete provision arising from
inadvertence or lack of foresight will not seriously impair the operation
of the trust.
Although it may appear that the act provides more liberal and extensive powers than many trustors would desire to give to the trustee,
a safeguard is found in the provision that if the testator desires, he can
release the trustee from any and all of them. Furthermore, if any
specific provision of the act is inconsistent with the provisions of the
trust, the latter shall control. Since the act is designed to supplement
rather than supplant the desires of the trustor, it would seem imperative that careful drafting be used to limit powers of the trustee as the
trustor may desire. Failure to do so may enlarge powers far beyond
his intention.
In Section 7, concerning the powers of the trustee, provision is made
for almost every conceivable activity that could be associated with
trust property. Most of these powers are those which were not possessed by the trustee under the common law and could be his normally
only if they were specifically provided for in the trust instrument.
These powers are in addition to authority otherwise granted by law
(and hence do not affect powers already established) and are to be
exercised in accordance with standards provided by law. Even though
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these powers are extensive, it would seem implicit in the language of
the act that they will not be interpreted as permitting any deviation
from the requirements of trustees' loyalty and his duty to preserve
and make productive the trust property.
The act, as might be expected, does modify some of the strict liability
of the trustee. Section 10, which is taken largely from the Uniform
Trust Act, permits suits against the trustee in his representative
capacity and makes the judgment therein obtained collectible from
the trust property. While the act allows the plaintiff to proceed in
tort either against the trustee personally or in his representative
capacity, in suits based on contract a plaintiff must sue the trustee
in his representative capacity, if the contract excludes personal liability
and the addition of the words "trustee" or "as trustee" excludes personal liability. Section 7(10) appears to relieve the trustee from liability on his evaluation and distribution of trust property, and Section
9 lessens liability to beneficiaries in some degree. However, these and
other instances of relief of liability are generally in accord with the
trend in recent decisions.
The act certainly has much of merit to recommend it. Although
some provisions will require testing and interpretation, it seems apparent that the overall objective of a more efficient administration of
trusts in this state will be achieved by the act.
Chapter 116-Trusts. The question whether a person who has
created a living trust can by his will leave property to the trust, the
so-called pour-over provision, has been very controversial. The two
grounds on which such a disposition by will may be upheld, although
the terms of the disposition do not appear in the will, are: (1) incorporation by reference, and (2) resort to facts of independent significance. It is possible to uphold the disposition on the ground of
incorporation by reference provided the trust instrument was in existence and referred to in the will as in existence at the time-of execution
of the will. The trust instrument is incorporated into the will.
It is also possible to uphold the disposition on the ground that the
living trust is a fact of independent significance. The testator is merely
adding property by will to a trust which has existence apart from the
will -that is, it has significance apart from the effect upon the property devised or bequeathed by will. The living trust and not the
instrument is a fact of independent significance.
If the living trust is not subject to revocation or amendment, it
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would seem that either by incorporation by reference, or by a fact of
independent significance, the bequest should be upheld.
The more difficult problem arises where the living trust is revocable
or amendable and is revoked or amended after the will is drawn.
Obviously the trust instrument cannot be incorporated by reference
since it was not, as amended, in existence at the time of the will.
However, it has been insisted that the living trust is a fact of independent significance just as much so after the amendment as before.
The authorities are in disagreement, some holding the property can
be disposed of only as the living trust was at the time of the will, and
others holding the disposition fails altogether.
In this uncertainty in the law as to the validity of a will provision
bequeathing property to an amendable and revocable trust, it was
dangerous not to repeat the entire trust in the will or to prepare
codicils to the will each time the trust was modified or amended.
About a dozen states have met this dilemma in the last few years by
enacting statutes, and Washington is now added to that number by the
enactment of chapter 116 of the Session Laws of 1959. The act permits devises or bequests to a living trust created by testator or other
persons (including insurance trusts) before or concurrently with execution of the will and provides that such bequest or devise is not invalid
because the trust is amendable or revocable or because it was amended
after the execution of the will. Furthermore, it is stated that unless
the will provides otherwise, the property so devised or bequeathed
shall not be deemed to be held under a testamentary trust, but is
merely adding property to the living trust to be administered under
the terms of the trust as it exists at the death of the testator, including
any amendments made either before or after the execution of the will.
Since the basis of such provisions is that the living trust is a fact of
independent significance, there is no such fact if the trust has been
revoked, and the act provides that in such case the devise or bequest
is invalid.
The act settles a controversial point and adds this jurisdiction to the
growing list of states disposing of the problem by statutory provision.
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